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The evolving institutional work of the National Collegiate Athletic Association to maintain
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dominance in a fragmented field
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Abstract

11
12

High-profile sport governance associations tend to remain intact despite numerous issues that

13

would predict their demise. As such, these types of associations offer valuable contexts for

14

understanding institutional maintenance work. The authors conducted a historical case study of

15

the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in the U.S. More than 7000 pages of

16

documents spanning more than 100 years were analyzed to document how the NCAA rose to

17

dominance in a contested field and cemented its governance as the taken-for-granted model of

18

collegiate and amateur sport in the U.S. despite numerous issues that would predict the

19

association’s demise. Findings suggest that the NCAA evolved its methods for controlling

20

institutional boundaries, practices, and cognitions as means for maintaining its dominance. By

21

expanding its boundaries, adjusting its practices, and framing member and public cognitions, the

22

NCAA has been able to create an institution that is responsive to members and defensible against

23

legitimate contestations.

24

Keywords: Institutional theory, Institutional work, College athletics, Sport Governance
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1. Introduction

26

Sport tends to be organized by associations that provide structure and rules for

27

competition, regulate transactions among organizations, and provide frameworks of cognition

28

within a given sport context (Kikulis, 2000). The governance of these associations tends to

29

become institutionalized with the actual governing bodies becoming institutions in their own

30

right. That is, they become “organization[s] infused with value” (Selznick, 1957, p. 17) that

31

provide “shared rules and typifications that identify categories of social actors and their

32

appropriate activities or relationships” (Barley & Tolbert, 1997, p. 96). Especially at the highest

33

levels of competition, sport governing bodies tend to remain in control of their various domains

34

for extensive periods of time. In fact, the International Olympic Committee (IOC), Fédération

35

Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), International Cricket Council (ICC), and World

36

Rugby have all governed for well over 100 years and have become dominant institutions within

37

their contexts. This pattern is interesting and somewhat unusual as institutionalized associations

38

and governance structures tend to be somewhat volatile and prone to change (Hinings,

39

Greenwood, Reay, & Suddaby, 2004).

40

The inclusion of institutional theory in sport management research has proven useful for

41

both explaining sport phenomena and for extending understandings of institutions (Washington

42

& Patterson, 2011). Sport management scholars have examined various institutional topics, such

43

as organizational responses to shifting institutional logics (Nite, Singer, & Cunningham, 2013;

44

O’Brien & Slack, 2003, 2004; Skirstad & Chelladurai, 2011; Washington & Ventresca, 2008),

45

impacts of institutional change (Heinze & Lu, 2017; Kikulis, 2000; Skille, 2011; Slack &

46

Hinings, 1992), and institutional work (Dowling & Smith, 2016; Edwards & Washington, 2015;

47

Nite, 2017; Nite & Washington, 2017; Woolf, Berg, Newland, & Green, 2016). Given their
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longevity and seeming resistance to institutional upheaval, the institutional structures and

49

processes of engrained sport associations offer interesting contexts of inquiry. Arguably, many of

50

the most high-profile sport associations have even sown what Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy

51

(2002) termed “seeds of self-destruction” (p. 196). That is, they have been embroiled in

52

legitimacy crises (e.g. Wagner, 2011; Wagner & Pedersen, 2014), scandals (e.g. Donaghy,

53

2010), and contradictory logics (e.g. Nite & Bopp, 2017; Southall, Nagel, Amis, & Southall,

54

2008). However, many high-profile sport governance associations tend to endure and maintain

55

their dominance, which seems to counter popular organizational theorizations of institutional

56

change (see Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Hinings et al., 2004; Seo & Creed, 2002).

57

One governance association that has become an institution in its own right is the National

58

Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), which governs the majority of intercollegiate sport in

59

the U.S. Whereas sport is structured somewhat differently in the U.S. compared to most

60

international settings, the case of the NCAA offers insight into how an association builds

61

institutional structures and maintains those despite elements that organizational theorists have

62

suggested should result in substantial changes of governance in the field. Thus, the purpose of

63

this study was to examine how the NCAA has remained intact despite predictors of institutional

64

change. We detail the processes whereby the NCAA seized control of a fragmented field,

65

institutionalized its governance in the field of intercollegiate athletics in the U.S., and remained

66

institutionalized despite contradictory logics, divergent internal interest groups, and vociferous

67

contestations from external contenders. Drawing upon the tenets of institutional work, we

68

collected nearly 100 years of documents spanning various periods of growth and instability of

69

the NCAA within U.S. intercollegiate athletics. In doing so, we provide a more complete

70

understanding of how institutions maintain despite seeds of change.
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The results of our historical examination suggest that the NCAA learned to maintain

72

control over the field of college athletics by learning how to control boundaries, practices,

73

cognitions of the institutional properties. Our research offers extensions to a burgeoning body of

74

institutional work research within sport management. We move beyond recognizing the

75

importance of institutional work in building and maintaining sport institutions (see Dowling &

76

Smith, 2016; Edwards & Washington, 2015; Nite & Washington, 2017; Woolf et al., 2016) by

77

outlining the how institutional work evolves in to address various tensions. Although the

78

specifics of our research are contextually bound, we contend that the evolution of institutional

79

work exhibited by the NCAA provides relevant insights for understanding the endurance of other

80

dominant sport governing bodies.

81

2. Theoretical framework

82

We draw from the traditions of institutional theory and the emergence of institutional

83

work (Washington & Patterson, 2011). We understand institutions as “more or less taken-for-

84

granted repetitive social behavior that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive

85

understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social

86

order” (Greenwood et al., 2008, pp. 4–5). Whereas early work in the institutional theory tradition

87

examined how social order was self-reproduced, recent research has drawn upon concept of

88

embedded agency (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Holm, 1995, Seo & Creed, 2002,

89

Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Embedded agency entails, “how

90

actors whose thoughts and actions are constrained by institutions are nevertheless able to work to

91

affect those institutions” (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010, p. 189). Built on this notion, scholars have

92

described institutional work as “purposive actions carried out by individual and collective actors

93

to create, maintain, and disrupt institutions” (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2011, p. 52). Some
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institutional scholars have regarded maintenance as the uncontested, taken-for-granted

95

reproduction of institutional scripts (Jepperson, 1991), yet the institutional work lens indicates

96

that maintenance may not be a stable property of the institutional order and various forms of

97

work are necessary to ensure institutional continuity and stability (Micelotta & Washington,

98

2013).

99

Scholars have theorized the fleeting stability of institutionalized structures and patterns of

100

governance (Hinings, Greenwood, Reay, & Suddaby, 2004). Instability can be attributed to a

101

host of factors, such as changing political environments (King & Pearce, 2010), evolving

102

industry standards (Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001), conflicting logics and interests among

103

stakeholders (Seo & Creed, 2002), along with scandals and organizational corruption (Misangyi,

104

Weaver, & Elms, 2008). These may result in fissures in the institutional fabric that may be

105

exploited by change agents seeking to create more favorable arrangements better suited to their

106

interests (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). In this

107

regard, institutional change may seem unavoidable; however, dominant organizations and

108

powerful institutions do not simply yield to change efforts. Actors benefitting from existing

109

institutional arrangements work to maintain prevailing institutional practices and norms

110

(Fligstein, 2001; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Yet, some have even

111

shown that efforts to maintain and institutionalize result in “seeds of self-destruction” (Garud et

112

al., 2002, p. 196; see also Seo and Creed, 2002). Lawrence (1999), as well as Zietsma and

113

Lawrence (2010), noticed that efforts to control institutional boundaries and membership created

114

tensions that could result in the instabilities. This pattern would then suggest an inevitability of

115

an institution’s demise. Theoretically this might be true. However, conceptualizing institutional

116

change as an unending cycle is problematic, considering anecdotal evidence that suggests some

INSTITUTIONAL WORK AND NCAA - 7
117

institutions have sustained despite inherent instabilities. In short, as was argued more than 20

118

years ago, “We need better information about the life course of institutions” (Scott, 1995, p. 146)

119

to better understand why some institutions overcome challenges and persist despite opposition

120

while others falter.

121

The sport industry is well positioned to offer insight into institutional longevity. Globally,

122

numerous sport organizations, leagues, and institutions have remained in operation despite

123

engrained elements and various circumstances that would predict change. For instance, the IOC

124

and FIFA have endured embezzlement and bribery scandals (Maennig, 2005; Pielke, 2013). The

125

IOC has also faced legitimacy crises with numerous athlete doping scandals that led to the

126

formation of the World Anti-Doping Agency (Wagner, 2011; Wagner & Pedersen, 2014). U.S.

127

sport leagues have endured issues of illicit gambling of officials and players (Donaghy, 2010;

128

Ostertag, 1992), performance enhancing drugs (Mitchell, 2007), and issues related to player

129

safety (Sagerian, 2012). Other sport organizations, such as the NCAA in the U.S., are influenced

130

by conflicting institutional logics and stakeholders with divergent agendas (Nite & Bopp, 2017;

131

Southall et al., 2008; Washington & Ventresca, 2008). These types of issues constitute seeds of

132

change that may provide opportunities for other sport institutions to be established; yet, many

133

high-profile sport entities have been able to maintain institutional dominance in their respective

134

contexts. With the current study, we endeavor to provide insight into how and why some sport

135

institutions have endured despite institutional elements that would predict institutional upheaval.

136

3. Empirical context

137

Our research was situated within the context of intercollegiate and amateur sport in the

138

U.S. Specifically, we examined the NCAA and the actions taken to solidify its dominance within

139

this context. We argue that the NCAA has evolved into an institution. The NCAA is a collection
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of processes and practices that result in the taken for granted notion that colleges should engage

141

in sport. The notion of the NCAA gives rise to sport conferences, rules with regards to

142

amateurship, revenue sharing among college conferences as well as who is eligible to play and

143

organize college sport. In short, we argue that the NCAA defines the appropriate activities and

144

relationships among member colleges in regards to collegiate athletics (Barley & Tolbert 1997,

145

p. 96).

146

Within the sport management literature, research on the NCAA has become somewhat

147

commonplace, especially among those studying sport institutions (see Nite, 2017; Nite &

148

Washington, 2017; Southall, Nagel, Amis, & Southall, 2008; Walker, Seifried, & Soebbing,

149

2017; Washington 2004; Washington & Ventresca, 2008). Despite its common usage as an

150

institutional research context, the NCAA was particularly suited for this inquiry for multiple

151

reasons. First, there is an abundance of internal and external documentation of its history as it has

152

taken place in the public eye. Secondly, the NCAA’s dominance is particularly interesting

153

because institutional theorists have noticed that institutional change is predictable given the types

154

of challenges the NCAA has faced throughout its history. Scholars, media pundits, watchdog

155

organizations, and even the U.S. government have levied harsh criticisms on the NCAA’s

156

governance and underlying philosophy of amateur college athletics. The NCAA has faced

157

various calls for reform (e.g. Benford, 2007; Gurney, 2009), litigation of its rules (e.g. NCAA v.

158

Board of Regents; O’Bannon v. NCAA), organizations attempting to institute new forms of

159

governance (e.g National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics; Amateur Athletic Union), and

160

scathing attacks to its core ethos (e.g. Southall et al., 2008; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013;

161

Sperber, 2000; Staurowsky & Sack, 2005). Despite these challenges, the NCAA has remained

162

the primary governing body of college athletics. As we trace the life-course of the NCAA, it is
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necessary to account for the early history of amateur sport and intercollegiate athletics in the

164

U.S.

165

Although colleges were engaged in intramural as well as intercollegiate athletics before

166

the founding of the NCAA, the NCAA became the typification of the “collegiate way” in terms

167

of how colleges should engage in sports. Intercollegiate athletic competition first occurred in the

168

mid-1850s when Harvard competed against Yale in crew. Colleges and universities, along with

169

their alumni and student bodies, recognized the benefits of pride and visibility associated with

170

athletic competitions. One writer suggested in the 1864 Yale literary magazine that winning the

171

crew championships was “sacredly connected with the glory of alma mater herself” (as cited in

172

Smith, 1988, p. 13). Colleges and universities began to utilize their athletics programs, primarily

173

football, as means for increasing visibility and esprit de corps (Washington, 2004).

174

As athletics continued to grow, numerous entities (e.g., conferences, councils, and

175

individual universities) attempted to organize competitions yet were confronted with tenuous

176

debates regarding implementation of rule structures for football and other sports. Yale and

177

Princeton played under rules that were more similar to soccer while Harvard used rules that were

178

more similar to rugby. During the first football game between Harvard and Yale in 1875, Yale

179

conceded to using Harvard’s rules (Washington, 1999). Although Yale won that game and the

180

next 14 in a row, the Harvard rules became institutionalized during the creation of the

181

Intercollegiate Football Association. Some schools resisted and eventually left the IFA (Falla,

182

1981), resulting in different universities operating with different rule sets. In efforts to

183

consolidate, Cornell, Harvard, Navy, Pennsylvania, Princeton, and Yale formed the American

184

Football Rules Committee. However, the committee was met with resistance, as schools in the

185

West did not like the rules from this entity. The discussion led to seven schools forming what is
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now the Big Ten Conference (in 1895 and the Ivy League formed in 1898; Stagg, 1946). The

187

primary concern with the rules was the violent nature of early football, with some seasons had as

188

many as 44 deaths (Leifer, 1995). The early attempts at quelling the violence resulted in less

189

entertaining football for the fans (Stagg, 1946). Ultimately, schools reverted back to more

190

entertaining styles of football despite the occurrence of more player deaths.

191

In 1905, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt had called a meeting with Yale, Harvard,

192

and Princeton to discuss rules for curtailing the violence in football (Smith, 1988). President

193

Roosevelt also warned these schools of government intervention if the brutal play was not

194

addressed, yet none of the institutions followed his suggestions. By the end of that year,

195

numerous serious injuries, including the death Harold Moore of Union College led to a meeting

196

between 62 colleges and universities with President Roosevelt to discuss brutality in football

197

(Flath, 1963). In addressing the attendees, President Roosevelt stated,

198

[H]e liked the game (football), but felt that something should be done to reform the rules,

199

especially in the interest of fair play and discouragement of rough play, and asked them

200

to undertake to start a movement to that end (front page New York Times October 10,

201

1905).

202

The meeting ultimately led to the formation of the Intercollegiate Athletic Association which, in

203

1910, changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (Stagg, 1946).

204

Since establishing its authority, the NCAA has defended both its governance and the

205

legitimacy of the intercollegiate model from various challengers on multiple fronts. The earliest

206

contestations to its authority emerged from a rival organization, the Amateur Athletic Union

207

(AAU). The AAU and the NCAA battled for control over high-profile amateur sporting events

208

(i.e. men’s college basketball) and Olympic endorsement (Flath, 1963). Other organizations,
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namely the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA), competed with the NCAA

210

for membership from universities. Further, technological advances endangered the revenue

211

streams and led to extensive legal issues between the NCAA and its members, thereby

212

endangering the viability of the field (Nite & Washingon, 2017). Despite these numerous

213

contestations from different challengers, the NCAA has maintained its position of power through

214

strategic actions. As such, our study was guided by the broad research question of how has the

215

NCAA remained the dominant institution in U.S. intercollegiate athletics despite elements that

216

would predict institutional change?

217

4. Method

218

We designed the research as a historical case study of the NCAA’s dominance in

219

collegiate and amateur sport within the U.S. The approach is especially appropriate when

220

studying institutions, as scholars have advocated for studying the life course of institutions

221

(Scott, 1995). Indeed, previous researchers have recognized the utility of this approach for

222

understanding various facets of institutionalization within different fields, including college

223

athletics (see Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Washington, 2004; Washington &

224

Ventresca, 2004, 2008). These methods were particularly appropriate because understanding of

225

social actions requires researchers to consider how social contexts in which actors are embedded

226

evolve over time (Kieser, 1994). Historical case study methods capture the evolving contours

227

that characterized the different stages of institutional developments.

228

4.1 Data sources

229

To understand the maintenance work of the NCAA, we compiled archived documents

230

and numerous historical accounts of the NCAA, college athletics, and amateur sport in the U.S.

231

from various sources. Consulting multiple sources from various authors was necessary
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considering historical accounts often reflect the biases of the narrators, and records might not

233

provide complete accounts of events due to the scope and focus of authors (Kieser, 1994;

234

Hargadon & Douglas, 2001). As such, triangulation of the data for this inquiry required multiple

235

data from unrelated sources (Berg & Lune, 2004; Glaser & Strauss, 2009). Data were drawn

236

from the postgraduate works of Flath (1963), Hoover (1958), and Land (1977); yearbooks and

237

conference proceedings from the NCAA archives (years from 1951-1986); and various other

238

accounts of the NCAA’s history such as Dunnavant (2004), Rudolph (1962), Byers (1995),

239

Shulman and Bowen (2011), and Smith (1988). In total, we consulted more than 7000 pages that

240

documented the evolution of the NCAA’s rise to power and maintenance of its dominance (see

241

Appendix A). Given that this research spanned a period of more than 100 years, pragmatism

242

dictated focusing on key moments of struggle in the field of collegiate sports that challenged the

243

primacy of the NCAA as an institution. Theorized as “seeds of change,” we began by examining

244

the early years of the NCAA and its work to establish legitimacy, struggles of managing

245

television broadcasts, implementation of Title IX, and continuous debates of amateurism. The

246

data snowballed to include the consequences of organizational actions (e.g. the NCAA’s

247

restructuring in the 1970s that was a result of struggles between small and large schools).

248

Although historical accounts may never be fully reconciled, we are confident that the diverse and

249

abundant sources consulted yielded accurate, theoretically sound insights into the NCAA’s work

250

to maintain dominance in college and amateur athletics.

251

4.2 Data analysis

252

Data analysis for this study entailed an inductive grounded theory-building approach

253

(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012). The analytic process commenced

254

following the recommendations and examples provided by Langley (1999) and Zietsma and
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Lawrence (2010). By engaging in the process of abduction (see Timmermans & Tavory, 2012),

256

we were able develop new theoretical insights within known theoretical traditions (Gehman et

257

al., 2017). Following the recommendations of Gioia et al (2012), data coding commenced with

258

the identifying of first order concepts. During the coding process, we met regularly to discuss the

259

emergent constructs and to refine the analytic process. Data were continually scrutinized to

260

ensure a comprehensive compilation of concepts. While identifying first order constructs, we

261

simultaneously theorized relationships among concepts to establish second order themes. Like

262

most qualitative research, this process was recursive, wherein coding and relationships were

263

continually adjusted and revisited until a final data structure was identified. For example, the first

264

order concepts “rivalry between NCAA and NAIA” and “NCAA and AIAW vie for control of

265

women’s sport” comprised the second order theme of “size and identity of membership.” Given

266

the substantial history covered in this study, it is not surprising that overlapping ideas required

267

attention and extensive theorizing. These instances were debated among the researchers and were

268

often discussed with colleagues to confirm the team’s analysis. Ultimately, four aggregate

269

theoretical dimensions emerged from the second order themes that provided insight into how the

270

NCAA has been able to avoid institutional upheaval despite embedded elements of destruction

271

(see Figure 1).

272
273

[insert Figure 1 approximately here]
Given the challenges of bias with historical research and issues of theoretical

274

applicability due to contextual specificity, various strategies were employed to address

275

trustworthiness and transferability. First, thick description of the research context and positions

276

of actors within the context was provided so that readers could locate roles and constructs in

277

similar contexts (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Further, the findings and constructs of this research
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were discussed with people who were familiar with both the context and theoretical framework

279

of this study. These disinterested individuals provided insight into data interpretations and

280

challenged the researchers’ theoretical assumptions. Additionally, scholars with expertise in

281

other sport institutions were consulted regarding the applicability of the findings. Doing so often

282

resulted in us refining and further theorizing the data. As such, we are confident in the rigor,

283

transferability, and credibility of the findings beyond this study’s specific context.

284

5. Findings

285

As outlined in previous sections, the emergence of the NCAA as the dominant institution

286

in the field of intercollegiate athletics occurred through vociferous contestations from numerous

287

entities. Here, we present a chronology of the institutionalization and persistence of the NCAA.

288

In the following subsections, we discuss how the aggregate dimensions from our data evolved

289

over time. We recognized three broad time frames within which the NCAA worked to establish

290

and maintain dominance in the field. The first time frame encompassed the actions from the

291

inception of the NCAA in 1905 until 1942. It was during this period that the NCAA grew from

292

its initial 38 member schools to 314 schools in 1942 and included “nearly every college or

293

university of importance in the country” (Stagg, 1946, p. 81). The second time frame was 1942

294

to 1973. It was during this period that the NCAA dealt with issues, such as expansion of

295

membership to small universities, the impacts of the Sanity Codes, and the rise of televised

296

football, that would lead to the major restructuring of the NCAA’s governance structure in 1973.

297

The final time period was from 1973 until 2011. The modern challenges to the NCAA have been

298

most legal contestations that have resulted in certain changes such as loosening of governance

299

restrictions. Indeed, the NCAA’s modern strategies of managing contestations reflect the

300

struggles of the past by allowing the NCAA to know which battles to fight and which ones to
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ignore. As such, we provide insight into how some institutions survive when others succumb to

302

destruction by suggesting that governance associations like the NCAA learn to control the

303

boundaries, practices, and cognitions of institutions.

304

5.1 1905-1942: Instated to institutionalized

305

The NCAA’s rise to power was characterized by tempestuous development within both

306

the intercollegiate athletics and amateur sport in the U.S., which presented challenges to

307

coalescing the field of intercollegiate athletics. In its early years the NCAA struggled to establish

308

legitimacy while simultaneously creating and defending its boundaries of authority. College and

309

university officials were conflicted by the contradictory logics of the commercial appeal and the

310

educational identity of athletics (Chu, 1989). The general public and the U.S. government were

311

questioning the existence of college football given the game’s brutality. External organizations,

312

like the Amateur Athletic Union (AAU), were vying for dominance in amateur athletics and

313

would continually seek to undermine and delegitimize the NCAA. Even after the NCAA’s

314

dominance in intercollegiate athletics had become institutionalized by the 1940s, the head of the

315

United States Olympic Association was quoted in the New York Times suggesting, “college

316

athletes who receive scholarships because of their ability in sports become, in fact,

317

professionals” (New York Times, Dec 12,1949). The early legitimacy struggles were

318

complicated by the fact that many of these battles were highly publicized, sometimes becoming

319

issues that required intervention from Congress and other arms of the federal government.

320

Perhaps the most notable and public contestations occurred with the AAU. In the early

321

years of the NCAA, AAU was the foremost amateur athletic organization in the country. The

322

AAU, whose stated aim was control of all amateur athletics (Flath, 1963), governed lacrosse,

323

track and field, and basketball (Stagg, 1946). Affiliated with international amateur athletics and

INSTITUTIONAL WORK AND NCAA - 16
324

the Olympic Movement, the AAU attempted to invoke rules regulating amateur eligibility by

325

mandating the teams or schools with which its members could compete. Garnering an

326

endorsement from the International Olympic Committee recognizing it as the U.S.

327

representative, the AAU was a source of significant tension as it worked to undermine

328

amateurism within intercollegiate athletics. Although the AAU’s initial eligibility rules were

329

aimed to quell amateurs from competing against professionals, these rules became tools in the

330

organization’s fight against the NCAA. The AAU and its affiliates generally controlled the U.S.

331

Olympic organization, yet the NCAA had the highest numbers of amateur athletes on the US

332

Olympics teams. In addition, NCAA athletes, won more Olympic medals than athletes from the

333

AAU or any other organization U.S. amateur sport organization. Despite the AAU’s attempts to

334

delegitimize the NCAA, the NCAA’s legitimacy was strengthened by the success of its athletes.

335

Whereas stakeholders of intercollegiate athletics seemed to have divergent interests, there

336

seemed to be an implicit consensus that college sports should be played by amateurs (using

337

definitions similar to those of the AAU). The subscription to rules of amateurism in

338

intercollegiate athletics should have meant that the NCAA should have been subjected to AAU

339

rules. However, the NCAA and its members objected to this and set to establish their own rules

340

(Flath, 1963). Of its initial charges, perhaps the most difficult task for the NCAA was building

341

an association that could accommodate the interests of various constituencies while also adhering

342

to amateur values. Prior to the NCAA, intercollegiate athletics had gone from periods of student

343

organizing to tenuous partnerships between schools to disjointed conferences with differing rules

344

(Rudolph, 1962). As the association sought to expand its membership, the NCAA began to

345

codify rules that governed all aspects of intercollegiate athletics, including rules of gameplay,

346

membership, and organizational structure. The organization created various rules committees
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that worked to create a semblance of order within the field. With these committees, the NCAA

348

had established legislative and judicial entities for managing member grievances (Falla 1981),

349

thereby fostering stability within the field that had been foreign to not only intercollegiate but

350

also amateur athletics before the emergence of the NCAA.

351

The NCAA’s expansive governance was outpaced by the growing popularity and

352

commercialization of the field (Smith, 2000). As the popularity of college athletics grew, the

353

NCAA continued to face questions of legitimacy, especially in regards to amateurism. The

354

increasing revenues and desires to win football games led to corrupt recruiting practices of

355

athletes. In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation released a scathing report condemning these

356

practices. However, this report gained minimal traction with the public and resulted in only

357

minor rules changes from the NCAA. The reaction to the report was described as follows:

358

The Carnegie Foundation’s indictment of schools that subsidized athletes received front

359

page attention wherever big-time football was played, but it appeared on a Thursday

360

(October, 24), followed by the local university’s denial or a shrug of indifference, after

361

which the newspapers refocused their attention on what really mattered—how the local

362

home team would fare in Saturday’s game. (Oriad, 2012, p. 8).

363

Although this report was seemingly ignored, it had brought to light issues that would be

364

exacerbated as more universities sought to add athletics programs to tap into the well of athletic

365

revenues. The recruiting excesses continued and the increasing public interest had also resulted

366

in a rise of gambling on college football (Smith, 2000). As college football became increasingly

367

popular, the NCAA had new issues to address that would test its ability to control the institution

368

it had created.
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From the time of its initial commissioning to 1942 when it was noted that the NCAA was

370

indeed dominant within the field (see Stagg, 1946), the NCAA’s evolution entailed three

371

encompassing and overlapping activities. First, the NCAA strategically worked to establish itself

372

as the primary, legitimate governor of intercollegiate athletics and delegitimize the other

373

organizations that vied for control in the field. The NCAA established institutional boundaries

374

while creating the meaning of what entailed both collegiate and amateur sport in the U.S. A key

375

function of these efforts was also the work of instituting practices that would rally support from

376

key actors in the field. Similar to previous findings, this practice work complemented the

377

boundary work of the NCAA (Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010). Whereas this created inevitable

378

tensions with external amateur organizations (i.e. AAU), the subsequent battles of supremacy

379

strengthened the NCAA by forcing the organization to solidify its governance in the field. As the

380

NCAA cemented its external legitimacy through superior practice and outputs (i.e. college

381

athletes’ success in the Olympics), external organizations that attempted to control intercollegiate

382

sport were diminished to playing fringe roles. The manner in which the NCAA controlled

383

practices, boundaries, and cognitions evolved as its governance and the field matured.

384

5.2 1942-1973: Regulation to restructuring

385

As consumption of games became more tenable with the advent of television, the NCAA

386

was experiencing a new legitimacy issues created by the uncovering of questionable recruiting

387

tactics. In 1948, the NCAA sought to address recruiting issues by enacting the “Sanity Codes.”

388

These were sweeping rules that expanded the NCAA’s authority to enforce punishments for

389

inappropriate behavior from its membership. However, the Sanity Codes were eventually

390

repealed in 1952 due to the rigidity of the punishments (the only punishment was expulsion) and

391

later replaced with rules that allowed for more reflexivity (Smith, 2000). Despite its initial failure
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with the Sanity Codes, the NCAA had laid the framework of its ability to regulate inappropriate

393

behavior, which ultimately strengthened the legitimacy of its governance.

394

In addition to creating mechanisms for sanctioning, the NCAA sought to expand its

395

boundaries to encompass all of intercollegiate athletics. Yet, the NCAA was again faced with

396

vanquishing another competing organization, the National Association of Intercollegiate

397

Athletics (NAIA). The NAIA was founded in 1938 as the organization for marginalized

398

universities that had been excluded from both NCAA and AAU tournaments, particularly

399

basketball tournaments (Hoover, 1958; Land, 1977). The NAIA’s membership was composed of

400

liberal arts colleges, teachers’ colleges, and historically Black colleges that had traditionally been

401

ignored by the NCAA (Hoover, 1958). As the NAIA began to grow and attract media attention,

402

it presented a legitimate threat to the NCAA given its large membership and on-court successes.

403

By 1955, the NAIA’s membership had ballooned to 435 members (just four fewer members than

404

the NCAA) and had one of its members represent the U.S. in the Pan-American Games (Hoover,

405

1958).

406

To address the small college concerns, the NCAA organized a small college committee in

407

the late 1930s and instituted a college division in 1952 that was designed to accommodate the

408

interests of the previously marginalized colleges and universities (Falla, 1981). The NCAA made

409

this division attractive by creating small college post-season tournaments that offered national

410

championships for the members of this division. Further, the NCAA created different levels of

411

membership wherein some small colleges could be affiliated with the association while paying

412

minimal dues (Falla, 1981; Stagg, 1946). Then by the 1960s, the NCAA began to accept

413

memberships from and allowed historically Black colleges to compete in sponsored events.

414

These strategic actions had begun the process of making the NCAA an attractive association for
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the less prestigious colleges and universities in the U.S., thereby resulting in the growth of the

416

NCAA and marginalization of the NAIA.

417

As the NCAA was working to expand the scope of its control, a new technology

418

threatened to topple the entire sport industry. The advent of television and televised broadcasts

419

presented significant challenges for the NCAA. This emerging technology necessitated action

420

from the NCAA given that the unregulated broadcasting of football games was negatively

421

impacting gate receipts for universities. As noted in the 1951 NCAA yearbook,

422

The concern of the colleges of the country with the effects of television upon football

423

attendance and thus upon the future of intercollegiate and intramural athletic and physical

424

training programs became more and more evident as sets began to saturate important

425

collegiate areas…One important conference, the Big Ten, went so far as to ban live

426

television during the 1950 season and other conferences have followed suit.

427

In 1952, a television committee was commissioned to develop a plan for managing

428

televised broadcasts of football games that would not only prevent extensive revenue losses but

429

would also monetize the broadcasts for the association. This committee, working in conjunction

430

with data from the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), developed an encompassing plan

431

of rules that were designed to limit the adverse effects of television. By 1960, the NCAA

432

membership had settled upon a revised proposal that allowed the NCAA to negotiate all

433

television contracts and limit the number of broadcasts per school. By 1973, the NCAA’s

434

television contracts had reached $6.75 million per year and had resulted in the cancellation of the

435

NAIA’s most lucrative television contracts.

436
437

Though television would ultimately prove to be an abundant source of revenue for the
NCAA and its members, this new technology also exacerbated issues between the smaller
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colleges and the larger universities. The most influential universities, which had shifted from the

439

elite academic institutions of the northeast to major football universities in Southern and

440

Midwestern geographic regions of the U.S., believed that their revenue earning potential was

441

being stifled by the NCAA’s limitations placed upon television broadcasts. The non-elites were

442

primarily concerned with the financial strains of trying to compete with the larger universities.

443

These divergent concerns presented a significant challenge to the NCAA, as satiating the

444

concerns of all its constituents was seemingly unfeasible. Concerns regarding the scope of

445

NCAA governance authority resulted in conflicts with high status stakeholders. In an

446

unprecedented move, the NCAA called its 1st Special Convention in 1973 wherein the NCAA

447

restructured into three separate divisions that would be more reflexive to the diverse needs of its

448

growing membership. Colleges and universities were able to align themselves with other

449

members that operated within similar constraints and had similar interests while also being able

450

to compete in postseason competitions for championships in their respective divisions. Under

451

this new structuration, members of each division were allowed to establish criteria for

452

membership and bylaws for governance. This measure eased internal conflicts among the

453

membership as small school interests were still protected while the larger elite universities were

454

unburdened and allowed to pursue their own interests.

455

Further, it was during this time period of restructuring that the NCAA gained supremacy

456

over the NAIA. Prior to 1974, colleges were permitted dual membership with the NCAA and

457

NAIA, which allowed them to choose which postseason tournament they would attend (Land,

458

1977). This adversely affected the NAIA, as the best teams in its membership were needed for its

459

tournaments if it hoped to draw media attention and generate revenue. Given the higher status of

460

the universities affiliated with the NCAA, the declarations of fringe universities did not impact
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the sustainability of its postseason competitions. In what turned out as a strategic blunder in

462

1974, the NAIA began requiring its members to declare prior to the start of the athletic seasons

463

within which post season tournaments they would participate (those of the NAIA or NCAA).

464

This rule change resulted in many NAIA schools defecting to join the NCAA. Although the

465

NAIA remained operational, it was no longer a threat to the NCAA’s dominance as the

466

organization’s membership had been substantially reduced.

467

The NCAA’s institutional work during this time period reflected the maturation of both

468

its governance and the field. The NCAA was no longer forced to justify its existence within the

469

broad field of amateur athletics and was tasked with solidifying its governance of intercollegiate

470

athletics. It strategically worked to expand its boundaries to include lower status colleges. It

471

developed means for enforcing regulations. Finally, the NCAA was forced to manage a

472

substantial regulatory crisis with the invention of television. The NCAA had become dominant to

473

the point that contending organizations such as the NAIA and AAU were no longer threats.

474

However, as detailed subsequently, the primary challenges emerged from diverse internal

475

interests (see Seo & Creed, 2002).

476

5.3 1973-2011: Crises of control and new legitimacy concerns

477

Much of the first half of the 20th century had been dedicated to solidifying the legitimacy

478

and scope of NCAA regulatory influence. By the 1970s, the NCAA had reached maturation as

479

the dominant institution in the field of intercollegiate athletics and had established itself as the

480

primary purveyor of amateur athletics in the U.S. The NCAA had successfully vanquished

481

competing organizations and had created a reflexive structure for managing issues among its

482

membership. With its legitimacy cemented and no real competition, the NCAA’s strategies for

483

addressing challenges evolved and the organization became emboldened. The 1970s-1980s
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presented issues that showcased this evolution, as new legislation, an economic downturn in the

485

U.S., and internal litigations tested the NCAA’s governance. The NCAA employed differing

486

strategies for addressing new challenges depending on the perceived legitimacy of the threat.

487

Broadly, legitimate challenges, meaning those originating from powerful internal or legislative

488

entities, would be addressed (Nite, 2017). Conversely, issues originating from illegitimate

489

sources were ignored or minimally acknowledged, as the potential for institutional damage was

490

minimal.

491

The NCAA’s restructuration in 1973 had gone a long way toward addressing conflicts

492

between the large and smaller members. However, the ire of the membership shifted to the

493

NCAA’s policies as the larger elite universities vied for further loosening of television broadcast

494

negotiation restrictions. These universities sought flexibility to negotiate individualized

495

broadcast contracts, a move that would require the NCAA to relinquish its sole-control of these

496

negotiations. Given the dearth of viable competing organizations, the NCAA adopted the brazen

497

approach of ardent defense of its rules, even against legitimate internal stakeholders. Despite

498

dissention from its larger members, the NCAA refused to relinquish its control of broadcast

499

negotiations. By the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, the NCAA would be mired in litigation

500

with the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia, two large stakeholders in the

501

field, wherein these universities took their fight with the NCAA to the courts (NCAA v. Board of

502

Regents). Ultimately, the courts ruled that the NCAA’s rules violated anti-trust agreements and

503

the organization was forced to adjust its rules accordingly. Individual universities and

504

conferences were allowed to negotiate their own television contracts but the NCAA remained in

505

control of negotiations for broadcasting rights for championship events. These court cases

506

ultimately resulted in the NCAA relinquishing control of the financial aspects of football bowl
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games. However, it preserved its control over which schools could play in bowl games, the

508

number of practices, and athlete eligibility. Despite the contemptuous litigation and loss of

509

revenue control, the NCAA retained the majority of its regulatory powers in sports other than

510

football.

511

The 1970s also provided another challenge for the NCAA and its membership: the

512

passage of Title IX. Passed in 1972, Title IX of the Educational Amendments decreed that

513

educational entities receiving federal funding were prohibited from discriminating on the basis of

514

sex. The law had profound effects in athletics as essentially all levels of schools, including

515

colleges and universities, were legally mandated to provide women and girls with opportunities

516

comparable to their male counterparts to participate in athletics (Staurowsky, 2003). As reflected

517

in the numerous roundtables of the mid-1970s NCAA conventions, NCAA member

518

representatives expressed consternation regarding the implementation of the new legislation. The

519

fear was that the inclusion of women’s sports would financially cripple many schools, requiring

520

them to abandon intercollegiate athletic competition altogether or drastically reduce the number

521

of sports universities would sponsor (Staurowsky, 2003).

522

The NCAA’s initial responses to Title IX reflected its maturity. Similar to the internal

523

issues of television contracts, the NCAA avoided making substantial changes and protested the

524

implementation of the new federal statute. Specifically, the NCAA passed resolution No. 133

525

that included the following wording, “[the NCAA] shall oppose any [Department of Health,

526

Education and Welfare] standard or administrative enforcement method which would require the

527

[Department of Health, Education and Welfare] to monitor and dictate in detail the financial

528

operations of the nation’s colleges and universities with respect to athletics.” Secondly, the

529

NCAA lobbied for support from powerful allies with former NCAA president John Fuzak
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soliciting the support of President Gerald Ford in opposition to Title IX. In his letter, he claimed

531

that the Title IX could potentially destroy big-time men’s intercollegiate athletics (Staurowsky,

532

2003). The NCAA and its membership avoided substantial changes until a series of lawsuits that

533

had reached the U.S. Supreme Court forced the NCAA and its membership into Title IX

534

compliance. At this point, the NCAA absorbed the fledgling organization, the Association for

535

Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), and brought women’s athletics under its

536

governance structure. Whereas some had feared that Title IX would topple the field, the NCAA

537

and intercollegiate athletics were cemented in American lore and continued with minimal

538

interruption.

539

In addition to Title IX, the NCAA was forced to defend its dominance in amateur sport

540

when the United States Senate Commerce Committee drafted a proposed bill in 1973 that would

541

have put the federal government in control of at least 30 amateur sports. This bill was introduced

542

in response to Congress’s increased frustrations of U.S. Olympic performances and the issues

543

between the NCAA and AAU. In fact, the NCAA had formally withdrawn from the United

544

States Olympic Committee (USOC) amidst concerns of the organization’s structural issues

545

(Nafziger, 1983). Although the bill eventually passed as The Amateur Sports Act of 1978,

546

substantial opposition from the NCAA resulted in the NCAA maintaining control over

547

intercollegiate sport. The NCAA rejoined the USOC through a series of negotiations and

548

compromises wherein the USOC agreed to numerous changes specified by the NCAA. As noted

549

in the 1978 volume of the NCAA news:

550

The NCAA’s withdrawal, along with the discontent expressed by many closely

551

associated with the Olympic effort, led to the formation of the President’s Commission
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on Olympic Sports. Many of the recommendations from the [President’s Commission on

553

Olympic Sports] were incorporated into the USOC’s reorganization. (p. 7)

554

The NCAA’s influence and legitimacy were bolstered through this process as its defense of its

555

power resulted in a victory over a federal agency.

556

Finally, the NCAA’s evolution is seen in its responses, or lack thereof, to illegitimate

557

challengers. Noticeably, the NCAA had learned to turn a deaf ear to the yammering of external

558

organizations that would periodically protest the NCAA’s practices and governance. In the

559

tradition of the Carnegie Foundation reports, organization such as the Knight Commission on

560

Intercollegiate Athletics and the Drake Group have issued several reports and op-eds criticizing

561

the NCAA and calling for reform in intercollegiate athletics. Whereas the earlier Carnegie

562

Foundation report had received moderate attention and resulted in some alterations to NCAA

563

policies, these later renditions were met with minimal response. The NCAA and its membership

564

have recognized that these types of contestations posed minimal threat as they originated from

565

entities that had no authority within the field. Consider the following excerpt from an open letter

566

penned by the Director of Athletics at Virginia Commonwealth University wherein he dismissed

567

the significance of the findings of a recent report from the Knight Commission that criticized

568

excessive spending:

569

The article, which ran initially without any input from VCU athletics, focused on an

570

increase in Athletics spending from 2005-2011…From the beginning of my tenure last

571

year we developed and implemented a strategic plan that in part focused on fiscal

572

responsibility and improving the experience of our student-athletes. It is my belief that

573

the facts show that this focus has paid dividend…VCU Athletics is winning while
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spending efficiently. (see http://forums.vcuramnation.com/threads/response-to-the-

575

knight-commission-report.12559/)

576

After more than a century of challenges, the NCAA and its members had learned to ignore

577

illegitimate challengers. In the rare instances wherein challenges from non-core stakeholders

578

would result in litigation, the NCAA would revert to the method of defending its practices and

579

only adjusting when forced to do so.

580

As the field and its governance matured, much of the NCAA’s maintenance work

581

entailed creating and adjusting rules of practice while making the internal structuration more

582

responsive to members. This responsiveness, coupled with strengthened boundaries and

583

legitimate institutional cognitions, allowed the NCAA to respond to potential damage from

584

internal contestations. This evolution can be noted in the NCAA’s easing of restrictions

585

regarding food allotments and scholarship structures for athletes. Further, the NCAA learned that

586

contentions from challengers outside of the boundaries of the field often did not warrant

587

responses. In the beginning, the NCAA had heated struggles with external organizations (e.g.

588

YMCA, AAU) over who would dominate amateur sport in the U.S. As the NCAA evolved, it

589

learned to coexist with these and similar organizations by focusing on internal issues. In this

590

regard, it has avoided the creation of unneeded tensions, having established legitimacy and

591

solidified its boundaries to the extent that rogue challengers (e.g. media pundits and watch dog

592

organizations such as the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics) can be ignored. The

593

NCAA has relied primarily on discursive framing strategies to combat legitimate external

594

challenges (Nite, 2017). As such, the NCAA evolved its defense strategies over the years to

595

reflect its dominance within the field that it first created and now is tasked with maintaining.

596

This evolution is depicted in Figure 2.
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598

[insert Figure 2 approximately here]
6. Discussion

599

Given the number of indicators of institutional change, the case of the NCAA is

600

theoretically intriguing as it offers an exemplary illustration of institutional maintenance work as

601

the NCAA has remained dominant despite elements predicting change. Starting from concerns

602

over the violence in football, 62 universities were invited to a meeting. Out of this meeting, the

603

NCAA was created and 110 years later, the NCAA has grown to 1281 member schools (the

604

NAIA as the second largest governing institution in college sports has 250 members), governing

605

460,000 athletes and hosting 89 championships. In addition, more than 1000 of its athletes

606

represented 107 countries participated in the 2016 Olympic Games. Overcoming conflicts with

607

the AAU, YMCA, Olympic Committee, federal legislation of Title IX, and internal conflicts

608

with and among its member colleges, the NCAA represents a counter-narrative to theories of

609

institutional change as it has resisted the seeds of change and survived. There is much that can be

610

learned from the NCAA that informs both extant theory and practice beyond the context of this

611

study.

612

6.1. Theoretical contributions

613

We sought to understand of how a dominant sport institution endured despite elements

614

that would predict institutional upheaval. The primary strength of our study is that it provides an

615

account of how institutional work that spans the progression of a field from fractured infancy to

616

matured dominance. In this regard, we were able to draw from the life course of the institution to

617

understand the actions and consequences of those actions to provide answers to our research

618

questions (see Scott, 1995). We offer numerous extensions to the burgeoning institutional work

619

literature within sport management (see Dowling & Smith, 2016; Edwards & Washington, 2015;
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Nite, 2017; Nite & Washington, 2017; Woolf et al., 2016). Notably, we provide nuanced detail to

621

Dowling and Smith’s (2016) research, which outlined the importance of institutional work for

622

creating and maintaining sport institutions. Specifically, we move beyond recognizing that

623

institutional work occurs and detail the evolving nature of institutional work in congruence with

624

the maturation of a field (see Figure 3).

625

[insert Figure 3 approximately here]

626

Emerging fields generally exhibit fewer controlling mechanisms and less engrained

627

practices (Hardy & Maguire, 2017). Similar to previous research (see Battilana et al., 2009;

628

Currie, Lockett, Fin, Martin, & Waring, 2012; Zietsma & Lawrence, 2010), we found that

629

institutional entrepreneurs (in our case the NCAA) endeavor to bring order to the field by

630

establishing legitimate institutional structures (i.e. boundaries, practices, and cognitions) to

631

address various internal and external tensions (see Figure 3). For example, the NCAA had to

632

define what it meant to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition while simultaneously

633

negotiating the rules of competition, thereby developing the cognitive structures and boundaries

634

of the institution. We argue that similar processes can be noticed in other sport and non-sport

635

contexts. Consider the sport of rugby which currently operates with three different codes of

636

competition (i.e. Rugby Union, Rugby League, and Ruby 7s). Actors within each code have

637

undergone processes similar to the NCAA. Rugby entities have worked delineate the boundaries,

638

create practices, and develop cognitions that create institutional structures that would allow them

639

to become dominant within the sport of rugby. When Ruby League split from Rugby Union,

640

Rugby League advocates had to create unique and agreed upon practices, establish delineating

641

boundaries, and develop cognitive structures, all of which were important for considering Rugby

642

League as a legitimate institution (Collins, 1998). Thus, we theorize that in emerging sport fields,
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institutional work entails the simultaneous creation of legitimate boundaries, practices, and

644

cognitions.

645

Through our analysis, we recognized outcomes that counter current understandings of

646

institutional change and stability. Early tensions, both internal and external, had profound effects

647

on institutional boundaries and cognitions. Previous scholars have highlighted that conflicts and

648

tensions among institutional members and from external challengers can be potentially

649

destabilizing to institutional structures (see Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Nite, 2017; Welty

650

Peachey & Bruening, 2011). However, we found that institutional structures may actually be

651

strengthened through tension and conflict. Especially in the earliest stages of field maturation,

652

we contend that internal issues among institutional members requires flexibility among member

653

interests. We found that as the field of intercollegiate athletics continued to evolve, the NCAA’s

654

flexibility to adjust to member interests allowed it to remain dominant. When the NCAA

655

attempted rigidity with its regulation of television, it suffered irreparable damage (Nite &

656

Washington, 2017). Institutions that have adapted their structures and regulations in a flexible

657

manner may actually be more enduring as flexibility gives space for multiple interests to exist

658

without destabilizing (see also O’Brien & Slack, 2003). Lok and De Rond (2013) recognized this

659

in their account of the Cambridge University Boat Club. The IOC adopted a similar approach in

660

allowing professional athletes to compete at the Olympic Games. The IOC had resisted the

661

inclusion of professional athletes across all sports for years. Some argued that this allowance was

662

made to increase television audiences which would be integral to maintaining the popularity of

663

the Olympics (Greene, 2012). In this regard, the IOC became flexible in its practices to

664

strengthen its institutional structures. Thus, we add nuance to Seo and Creed’s (2002)

665

theorization that competing interests create opportunities of change. We propose that flexible
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institutional structures born of internal contestations would be positively related to institutional

667

stability in sport contexts.

668

We found that external tensions impacted institutional boundaries, practices, and

669

cognitions in somewhat different manners. First, we noticed that external challenges provided

670

impetus for the NCAA to strengthen its practices and solidify its cognitions. In this regard, the

671

membership of the NCAA united in the bolstering of these structures. Similar processes occurred

672

in Micelotta and Washington’s (2013) study of Italian professionals who united to rebuff

673

government interference. Sport player associations may also provide a relevant example of the

674

utility of our findings. The Major League Baseball Player Association, a powerful union of

675

professional baseball players in the U.S. which one could argue has become an institution, used

676

the external threat from Major League Baseball’s collective ownership as a means for solidifying

677

their dominance in governance issues. Specifically, the league’s ownership endeavored to alter

678

the labor environment by instituting a salary cap for player salaries. The player’s union united to

679

resist this external threat and coalesced around agreed upon practices for fair labor standards,

680

ultimately leading the cancellation of the Major League Baseball World Series in 1994. To this

681

day, Major League Baseball labor standards are dominated by the player’s union (Lowenfish,

682

2010). Therefore, we propose that external contestations and tensions would be positively related

683

to strengthened institutional practices and cognitions.

684

We noticed that external contestations and tensions had different impacts on institutional

685

boundaries. We contribute to the existing arguments around boundary and practice work

686

regarding boundary permeability. Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) showed that permeable

687

boundaries allowed for innovation and combatted the alienation of marginalized stakeholders.

688

We recognized two different types of external challengers: those operating in similar fields (i.e.
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universities and colleges with membership in other associations) and those seeking to influence

690

the field (i.e. watchdog organizations, media pundits). The NCAA’s boundary work differed with

691

both groups. For those operating within the same space (i.e. college and university athletics), the

692

NCAA maintained an open view of membership and expanded its boundaries of influence. The

693

act of expansion solidified the NCAA’s dominance and diminished the capacity of competitors.

694

The boundary expansion of the NCAA seemed to mirror those of other dominant sport entities.

695

For example, others have documented the expansion of FIFA and have shown similarities in the

696

approach to expansion (see Sugden & Tomlinson, 1998). The notion of expansion challenges

697

existing research that has suggested restricting access from outsiders serves to maintain

698

institutional arrangements (Siebert, Wilson & Hamilton, 2017; Woolf, Berg, Newland, & Green,

699

2016). In their examination of a mixed martial arts gym, Woolf and colleagues (2016) outlined

700

how creating entry barriers helped control membership and maintained institutional

701

arrangements. Instead, we propose that open membership boundaries for those operating within

702

similar institutional spaces would be positively related to institutional maintenance and control.

703

Regarding external challengers who seek to influence the field, the NCAA evolved its

704

understanding of how to address contestations. During its infancy, the NCAA was forced to

705

address external challenges by developing legitimate practices and cognitions. As it matured and

706

became institutionalized, the NCAA evolved its responses to reflect its established legitimacy.

707

The NCAA no longer had to adapt to external threats beyond the realm of its influence. It has

708

learned to coexist with entities competing in similar realms (e.g. YMCA, AAU) as they no

709

longer posed threats to the NCAA’s dominance. Other externalities such as media pundits and

710

watchdog organizations are generally addressed through benign defense measures such as

711

discursive framing (Nite, 2017). Finally, we should note that legitimate threats, those being

INSTITUTIONAL WORK AND NCAA - 33
712

challenges that have potential to drastically alter institutional arrangements (Clemens & Cook,

713

2009), still necessitated action. We noted that shifting attitudes toward player safety concerns

714

were addressed by changing practices (see also Heinze & Lu, 2017). It is likely that institutions

715

learn to recognize which threats necessitate changes and which ones may be addressed through

716

defensive techniques such as framing. Thus, we contend that as institutional fields evolve from

717

infancy to maturation, institutional actors’ understanding of threats and defense strategies reflect

718

congruent evolution.

719

Finally, we contribute to understandings of institutional work and institutional

720

complexity. Considering the growing research in pluralism and institutional complexity

721

suggesting that there are multiple institutions and logics competing for dominance in a field

722

(Greenwood et al., 2011; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010), it is important for

723

institutional entrepreneurs to theorize which institutional arrangements require attention. The

724

NCAA is a classic case of institutional complexity wherein it must balance interests based in

725

multiple, often competing, logics (see also Nite, Singer, & Cunningham, 2013; Southall et al.,

726

2008; Washington & Ventresca, 2008). We suggest that learning to strategically adapt

727

boundaries, practices, and institutional cognitions may be key to maintaining institutional

728

dominance in these scenarios. This extends previous notions that have suggested that

729

maintenance is achieved by deference to actions rooted in dominant logics (Nite et al., 2013).

730

Our findings are similar to Skirstad and Chelladurai (2011), who showed that soccer clubs could

731

be structured to accommodate multiple logics. Further, O’Brien and Slack (2003) detailed the

732

process of adopting professional logics within English Rugby Union. Although

733

professionalization was counter to its traditions, English Rugby Union incorporated professional

734

practices to maintain legitimacy and dominance in the field. Indeed, O’Brien and Slack (2003)
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noted, “effective leaders must develop the capability to anticipate cognitive shifts in their

736

environment” (p. 444). As such, we propose that institutional maintenance is positively related

737

institutional adaptability in instances of institutional complexity.

738

6.2. Practical implications

739

Although the specifics of our research may be contextually bound, we contend that

740

concepts discussed here have practical utility for other sport entities seeking to preserve

741

authority, address conflicts, and maintain institutional structures. First, we emphasize the

742

importance of remaining flexible inside institutional boundaries. We found that flexibility of

743

practices had become a source of strength for the NCAA as it allowed for multiple interests

744

within the institution to coexist and evolve with changes in the field. Indeed, plasticity of

745

practices may be particularly for relevant for league executives dealing with issues such as

746

playoff formatting, regulation of gambling, managing player interests, and even approaches to

747

integrating technological advances. For instance, the National Basketball Association (NBA) has

748

reportedly discussed changing it playoff structure to address concerns of league stakeholders and

749

fans (Axson, 2018). NBA Commissioner, Adam Silver, has voiced support for legal sport

750

gambling in order to align the league with fan interests (Purdum, 2017). As such, the NBA has

751

seemingly provided support for our findings that flexibility is important for maintaining

752

institutions. In the case of the NBA, the league is seemingly working to preserve its place as one

753

of the world’s most popular sporting leagues and being able to adjust to changing environments

754

may be key in that endeavor.

755

Our research may also be informative for emerging leagues and fields. Particularly, the

756

eSports phenomenon has evolved within an interesting space that provides challenges to sport

757

practitioners and sport management scholars (see Cunningham et al., 2018; Funk, Pizzo, &
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Baker, 2018; Hallmann & Giel, 2018). Drawing from our findings, we suggest that practitioners

759

and sport management scholars should theorize field boundaries when considering how to

760

approach eSports. We outlined how expanding boundaries to encompass those competing in

761

similar institutional spaces works to strengthen institutional arrangements. It appears that other

762

sport entities may be adopting similar approaches. For example, Jerry Jones, owner of the Dallas

763

Cowboys, became part owner in a gaming company as a sign that he is embracing the potential

764

for eSports as an extension to the Dallas Cowboys brand (Wolf, 2017). Similarly, universities

765

such as the University of North Texas (see Carter, 2017), have started investing in eSports and

766

are considering whether to regulate these programs under current athletic department structures.

767

Thus, we suggest that being open to expanding boundaries may work to strengthen sport

768

institutions.

769

Finally, we highlighted the evolution of the NCAA learning how and, importantly, which

770

battles were important to fight. In this regard, the NCAA seemed to become adept at

771

distinguishing between the types of tensions and challenges that warranted adjustment to its

772

structures and those that required defense tactics absent of change. Effective theorization of

773

issues is especially important given changes within institutional environments. Sport

774

organizations and other governing bodies have been at the visible forefront of important issues

775

such as racial and gender equality, player safety, and corporate social responsibility. For

776

instance, professional athletes in U.S. have engaged in various peaceful forms of demonstration

777

against social injustices. The impact of athlete demonstrations for sport leagues is “complicated”

778

(Ho, 2017) and likely requires effective theorization by league officials regarding effective

779

practices and management of cognitions to address controversial issues.

780

7. Future research and conclusions
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In sum, our research outlined the evolution of a dominant sport association that has

782

become and institution in its own regard. Researchers have noted that “how institutions survive

783

beyond the lifespan of their creators is often seen as remaining in the realm of ‘the mystery’ of

784

institutions” (Siebert et al., 2017, p. 3). We sought to answer our focal question of how a

785

dominant sport association survives despite predictors of change. We found that evolving

786

institutional work of managing practices, boundaries, and cognitions were key to for the

787

NCAA’s dominance. The primary limitation of this study is that it was isolated to one particular

788

setting. We took steps to aid in the transferability of our findings, however, the nuances of our

789

study were contextually bound. Scholars should consider interrogating the viability of our

790

findings and theorizations in other relevant sport settings. Further, our study documented the

791

accounts of the winning governing body. The accounts of those who were adversely impacted by

792

the growth of the NCAA would strengthen our assertions. Scholars should consider questions

793

such as, how do fields evolve due to the presence of dominant sport associations? How do long-

794

lasting, conflict-winning dominant institutions shape entrepreneurial activities in the field?

795

Answers to these questions would offer deeper understanding to how dominant sport governance

796

associations remain in power.

797
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